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ABSTRACT 
 
This research is an attempt to make progress in the understanding of the process of board 
formation and its impact on the functions performed by the board in young entrepreneurial 
ventures. We study the link between board members’ characteristics and the effective 
accomplishment of monitoring and resource provision functions. Expanding earlier research we 
argue that the identity of external financiers matters in configuring the board and designing its 
working mode and roles. This is because different investors (1) may be endowed with different 
skills and knowledge, and (2) their social identities influence the motivation to accomplish 
different roles. We present a conceptual framework of the process of board formation in 
entrepreneurial firms and confront it with an in-depth longitudinal case study of a young venture 
that has received funding from business angels and venture capitalists. We show that board 
composition and routines are co-constructed by different (but not all) salient stakeholders who 
were involved in the first input of external capital. The intended and actual role of the board 
members depends on their specific capabilities and financial stakes and on processes of social 
identification. The observation of evolving board routines shows that certain members participate 
in two parallel processes of interaction with the entrepreneurs. Formal board meetings essentially 
serve the purpose of regular monitoring, whereas certain board members contribute to resource 
provision in parallel informal interactions, when they strongly identify themselves with 
entrepreneurs. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
     Traditional research on boards of directors has taken a special interest in boards of large 
established corporations featuring a strong separation of ownership and control (Fama and Jensen 
1983). Agency theory has been the dominant theoretical frame to understand boards’ functions and 
effectiveness (Daily et al. 2003), where efficient monitoring achieved through a majority of 
independent outside directors is supposed to be the principal source of superior performance as 
related to corporate governance. Empirical evidence on the subject, however, is highly 
inconclusive (Bhagat and Black 1999). In an effort to overcome the limitations of traditional board 
research, it has been acknowledged that boards may accomplish multiple roles, reaching from 
monitoring to the provision of different types of resources (e.g. cognitive, relational, legitimacy) 
(Zahra and Pearce 1989). Hence, a better understanding of a board’s actual functioning and 
process has been called for (Pye and Pettigrew 2005). In fact, the link between board members’ 
characteristics in terms of particular interests/incentives, demographics, knowledge and skills and 
the effective accomplishment of such functions as monitoring and resource provision is not 
immediate, but most likely depends on the way the board is initially configured and develops work 
routines through directors’ specific interaction. 
      The way a board works, the functions it may fulfill and, parting, its impact on performance can 
be supposed to depend on the specific circumstances of its formation and on the particular actors 
who contribute to its configuration and effective functioning. Interestingly, though, little attention 
has so far been given to the process of early board formation. One notable exception is work by 
Lynall et al. (2003), who suggest that a board’s composition and working style is likely to be 
influenced by the lifecycle-stage of its formation and the action of powerful stakeholders when the 
board is actually formed for the first time.  
 
     In the present contribution, we are specifically interested in the formation and early functions 
of the board of high growth entrepreneurial ventures when crossing an organizational threshold as 
they raise significant amounts of outside equity. Boards are actually formed through the action of 
different salient stakeholders, and the entrepreneur-CEO as well as the contributors of venture 
finance can be regarded as the central protagonists in the process of board formation (Lynall et al. 
2003). Our work brings together two distinct streams of research: entrepreneurial finance and 
corporate governance. In entrepreneurial finance, the identity of external financiers matters. Two 
types of actors typically specialize in the provision of external equity finance for entrepreneurial 
threshold firms: business angels and professional venture funds. They have been shown to play 
distinctive roles (e.g. Bonnet and Wirtz 2012), due to their specific motivation and cognitive 
features. Recent progress in research on corporate governance tends to emphasize that the 
relevance of different theoretical approaches concerning board roles likely depends on firms’ life-
cycle stages (Filatochev and Wright 2005; Lynall et al. 2003; Zahra and Filatotchev 2004; Zhang 
et al. 2011).  They do not, however, explore the process of the formation of boards as the result of 
the action of specific stakeholders at relatively early stages in a venture’s life cycle.  
 
     We argue that, beyond the contingency of the life cycle, the precise identity of external 
financiers matters in configuring the board of directors and understanding its working mode. This 
is because different investors (1) may be endowed with different skills and knowledge, and (2) 
their social identity potentially influences the intrinsic motivation to accomplish different board 
roles (Hillman et al. 2008). In other words, in a multiple-investor setting, for a specific investor, 
say business angel A, to be willing to join the board and be able to play a specific role (counsel, 
monitoring…) not only certain capabilities and skills (strategic knowledge, entrepreneurial 
capabilities, information acquisition skills…) and an economic incentive are required, but his 
social identity can also be supposed to have an impact on the actual role he chooses to play. 
 
     The present research is an attempt to make some progress in our understanding of the process 
of board formation and its impact on the functions performed by the board and its members, both 
individually and collectively, in fast growing entrepreneurial ventures. Specifically, we try to 
answer the question of why certain investors sit on the board or push other actors to do so and 
what functions they intend to and, eventually, do perform in the exercise of their board-
membership individually and with others. 
 
     The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Building on the combined literature of 
entrepreneurial finance and corporate governance, we first present a conceptual framework of the 
process of board formation in fast growing entrepreneurial threshold firms. We then confront this 
framework with an in-depth case study of a fast growing young technology venture that has 
received funding from several business angels and venture capitalists. Section 2 gives a 
description of our method, section 3 presents the case, and section 4 indicates the principal results. 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE AND THE NASCENT BOARD: CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
     Conventional research on boards of directors in the tradition of agency theory (Fama and 
Jensen 1983) may lead to the impression that the board is initially installed to accomplish a single 
function, namely ensure effective monitoring of the CEO. More recent approaches to corporate 
governance, especially those working from a cognitive and behavioral perspective (Charreaux and 
Wirtz 2006; Forbes and Milliken 1999; van Ees et al. 2009; Wirtz 2011) have questioned the 
exclusive focus on a board’s monitoring function. Different roles of the board have thus been 
identified (Zahra and Pearce 1989). To simplify, we may retain two main roles: monitoring and 
resource provision (especially of a cognitive and social nature through counsel, mentoring, 
establishing legitimacy, providing relationships, sustaining organizational learning). 
 
     The question then arises, however, of what determines the exercise of different board-roles. 
Casual observation suggests that certain board roles are more salient than others in specific 
companies, and one possible explanation that has been given makes economic context, especially 
in terms of a firm’s life-cycle stage, the critical determinant. Hence, Wirtz (2011) argues that due 
to their initial lack of the specific managerial capabilities required to master the dynamics of 
hyper-growth, fast growing entrepreneurial threshold firms have a strong incentive to use 
governance mechanisms as a cognitive lever, helping acquire and develop specific cognitive skills 
and capabilities, rather than making them a pure monitoring device. It must however be noted that 
it is not because threshold firms may feel a particularly strong need to acquire and develop such 
knowledge and skills that their boards are necessarily in a position to provide such resources. We 
argue that the board’s actual accomplishment of one or several of its potential roles (monitoring, 
resource provision) depends on the precise identity of its members and, hence, on the process of 
its formation and the work routines it develops as it goes along. After all, many young ventures go 
bankrupt because they are not in a position to acquire or develop the required skills and resources 
to overcome the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965). Others are successful, but the board is 
not the only mechanism which can be used to manage the particular challenges of fast growing 
entrepreneurial threshold firms (Wirtz 2011). 
      
     We propose a conceptual framework (figure 1), where the process of initial board formation is 
shown to be shaped not only by economic context but also by the specific identity of the 
participating stakeholders (external investors and entrepreneurs being the most salient in threshold 
firms), depending on their personal characteristics (knowledge and skills), economic motivation 
(financial stake) and intrinsic motivation (identity). Because life-cycle stages should not be seen as 
having deterministic consequences, the interaction of the specific actors forming the board is 
central to our understanding of the degree to which the board and its members eventually activate 
their different possible roles. We argue that, at the very early stage of board formation, individual 
salient stakeholders’ (especially investors’) intrinsic motivation as explained by a phenomenon of 
social identification (Hillman et al. 2008) may be the critical determinant in explaining who 
initially joins the board and what role he or she intends to play. The following sub-sections 
develop each of the framework’s dimensions in more detail, building on the combined research on 
entrepreneurial finance and governance.   
 
 Potential board roles: what is the board set up to do? 
 
     A major systematic assessment of different possible board roles as identified in the literature 
was proposed by Zahra and Pearce (1989). They identified three different roles or functions 
potentially accomplished by corporate boards, namely control, service and strategy. Later work 
has added a strong cognitive perspective (Forbes and Milliken 1999) and suggests a combination 
of the service and strategy functions in a single category, for the enhancement of strategic 
knowledge through learning on the board level can be considered as the provision of a dynamic 
cognitive resource. Hence we end up with two possible functions: control and service. “The 
board's control task refers to its legal duty to monitor management on behalf of the firm's 
shareholders (…) The board's service task refers to its potential to provide advice and counsel to 
the CEO and other top managers and to participate actively in the formulation of strategy” 
(Forbes and Milliken 1999, p. 492). The most recent research on board process in threshold 
ventures essentially takes up the same basic categories (Zhang et al .2011). Consequently, we 
distinguish in our theoretical framework two generic board roles: monitoring (or control) and 
resource provision in its largest sense (counsel, mentoring, networking, legitimacy, learning). The 
question is what weight is given to each by the constituting members of the board as it is first set 
up, and for which reasons?  
 
 Economic contingencies of the nascent board: life-cycle stage and growth dynamics 
 
     Specific economic contingencies, such as a firm’s lifecycle stage and growth, are one possible 
answer. The entrepreneurship literature has identified the liability of newness (Stinchcombe 1965) 
as a central challenge for young growing ventures. This concept means that young firms have to 
overcome a lack of various kinds of resources in order to survive and become established in the 
market. In particular, roles must be learned and (organizational, functional and entrepreneurial) 
and capabilities acquired (Landström et al. 2012). The necessity to acquire such capabilities and 
other cognitive and social resources (such as external network ties and legitimacy) may be 
considered to be especially strong in fast growing threshold ventures, because crossing the 
threshold means an increase in organizational complexity which, in fast growing firms, may be 
quasi-instantaneous. This does not leave the incumbent entrepreneurial top management team with 
sufficient time to develop the requisite skills by themselves. In such a situation, existing research 
suggests that the board of directors is one possible provider of the necessary cognitive and social 
resources (Daily and Dalton 1992, Hambrick and Crozier 1985, Zahra and Filatotchev 2004).  
 
     Empirical research on board process confirms that, in certain young high-technology ventures, 
the board does actually accomplish a strong service function. According to Zhang et al. (2011), the 
tension between roles (monitoring vs. resource provision) is resolved in favor of resource 
provision in actual board practice, although boards have the formal characteristics required to be 
good monitors. Zhang et al. lack however a compelling theoretical explanation of why the board 
of a technological threshold venture should always be set up and function as a resource provider. 
In theory, other governance mechanisms can substitute for the role of valuable resource providers, 
to fill the competence gap of young fast growing ventures (Wirtz 2011). It thus seems reasonable 
to turn to an examination of the individual motivations of threshold ventures’ salient stakeholders 
and constituting board members to better understand in what spirit the board is set up.  
 
 Entrepreneurial finance: characteristics of business angels and venture capitalists 
 
     According to Lynall et al. (2003, p. 421-422), for the threshold firm which is outgrowing its 
initial founding stage, “at the time of board formation, (…) two stakeholders (i.e., CEO and 
external financiers) can be considered the most salient to the organization and, thus, the most 
likely to influence board composition. (…) Although other stakeholders might influence board 
composition, the urgency and salience of the CEO's and external financiers' claims on the 
organization identify them as the most important vis-à-vis board composition”.  
 
     The two most frequently encountered types of external financiers at that particular development 
stage are business angels (BAs) and venture capitalists (VCs). BAs are predominantly actual or 
former entrepreneurs who invest their own money (Morrissette 2007), whereas VCs are finance 
professionals who manage investors’ money. Therefore BAs’ knowledge base and cognitive 
process are close to entrepreneurs’. Due to their experience they generally have good knowledge 
of a specific technology, industrial sector or market, and they express a preference for investing in 
industries they know (Wright et al. 1998). VCs, although some of them may have technological or 
industrial experience or expertise, often have a more generalist background. BAs’ investment 
objectives also appear to be closer to entrepreneurs’ than those of VCs. BAs want to make money 
but they grant less importance than VCs to precise IRR and exit timing objectives, and they appear 
to have diverse non financial goals such as challenge, fun, helping to start a new company, that are 
as (or more) important for them as (than) financial goals (Farrel 1998; Kelly and Hay 2003; 
Morrissette 2007). VCs set their objectives in financial terms only and need to control the exit as 
they are committed to create value for their fund providers in a limited time frame. These 
differences lead to the following questions regarding board formation: In fast growing threshold 
ventures, where BAs and VCs are the most salient stakeholders, can we assume that they all 
typically intend to join the nascent board? For those who do, what primary function do they wish 
to fulfill in their role as a board member? 
 
 Social identity and intrinsic motivation of board members 
 
     According to Hambrick et al. (2008, p. 384), understanding the directors ‘motivations to join 
the board is key “in comprehending board processes or effectiveness.” Concerning BAs and VCs 
the answer could appear to be rather straightforward, since a board seat may help control the 
potential risks affecting the individual investor’s financial stakes. But still, in ventures with 
multiple outside investors (several BAs and VCs at the same time), not all of them necessarily 
wish to join the board, even if they possess the necessary knowledge and skills. For those who do 
wish to participate, the question remains of how they conceive their principal role as directors, as 
the economic interests related to financial stake potentially benefit from both, monitoring (value 
capture) and resource provision (value creation). Since BAs and VCs are not homogeneous 
populations, they do not necessarily identify with the same board roles to the same extent. In fact, 
the external investors’ perception of and identification with specific board roles, which can be 
supposed to shape the way the newly created board ultimately functions, is likely to be related to 
their individual and social identities as construed in identity theory (Ashforth and Mael 1989; 
Hillman et al. 2008). 
 
     Hillman et al. (2008) propose a model linking directors’ identities and identification to the 
board roles they fulfill. Each individual holds multiple personal (e.g. being a father, brother, …) 
and social (e.g. being a professor, a CEO …) identities, and the strength of identification with each 
one in a particular context (e.g. on a board of directors) explains his or her preference for certain 
types of behavior/engagement. For example, an external board member who has also an important 
experience as former or actual CEO may be supposed to strongly identify with the CEO of the 
firm on whose board he serves. This is likely to lead to an intrinsic motivation to favor the 
resource provision role of the board over the monitoring function. According to Hillman et al. 
(2008), there are five contextually relevant identities for directors who serve on boards: director, 
CEO (entrepreneur), shareholder, organizational identity and stakeholder. For young threshold 
ventures which are still in a process of becoming, it is however reasonable to suppose that 
organizational identity is not yet stabilized and is thus likely to have low relevance in the specific 
context of the present study. Probably, a certain industrial identity (identification with a certain 
industry or profession) may be more relevant in this situation.  
 The identity and motivation of business angels and venture capitalists 
 
     We transpose the general frame of Hillman et al. to the specific case of the entrepreneurial 
threshold firm, where BAs and professional VCs contribute to growth as salient stakeholders. We 
expect that BAs typically identify more strongly with the entrepreneur-CEO than VCs, particularly 
when they have founded or managed a new venture themselves. This should create a strong 
motivation to provide assistance, counsel and other cognitive resources. In addition, the fact that 
angels’ investment objectives are not merely financial may also lead them to identify with the 
entrepreneurs and to adopt a resource provision role. BAs may also identify with specific 
industries in which they have a significant previous experience. This can provoke an additional 
motivation to provide resources to the young venture, particularly when it is involved in one of 
these industries. Another likely identification of BAs is “shareholder”, as they are investors in the 
young venture, which may conduct them to monitor management in addition to provide resources. 
We may expect this identification to be stronger when their financial stake in the venture is higher. 
      
     VCs’ main investment objective is to provide high financial returns to their investors, and they 
have strong economic incentives to do so. We therefore expect them to identify themselves mainly 
with shareholders. This may lead to both monitoring and resource provision roles, as these two 
roles can contribute to foster growth and create economic value. The relative importance granted 
to monitoring vs. resource provision is probably influenced by institutional factors (large and 
experienced VC organizations are expected to develop more structured and formalized rules to 
monitor portfolio companies), individual factors (i.e. personal characteristics and background) and 
economic contingencies. Another possible identification of VCs is “industry”, in the case they 
have a significant previous investment experience in a given sector. However this identification is 
expected to be generally lower for VCs than for BAs. 
 
METHOD 
 
Case selection and data collection 
 
     To be able to closely observe the process of board formation, we have chosen to do 
longitudinal case research with real-time observation, as suggested by Zhang et al. (2011). One 
central concept of our conceptual frame being identity, we have selected a case with multiple 
investors of various identities. The company (EBV) is a young and fast growing venture which 
completed its first financing round with four BAs and three VC funds investing simultaneously. 
An interesting feature of the case is that the external investors are very diverse with regard to their 
status, previous experience, knowledge and skills, as well as financial stakes in the venture, 
therefore offering a wide array of potential identities when serving on the board of directors (table 
1). 
 
     We performed three successive sets of interviews with the case’s actors between the end of 
2009 (i.e. six months before the financing round took place) and the fall of 2011 (table 1). Such 
real-time following of the case is likely to reduce bias related to loss of memory and obtain more 
reliable qualitative data concerning an unfolding process. The interviews were semi-directive. 
They lasted about one hour and a half on average, were tape recorded and transcribed. In 
complement to the interviews we obtained detailed profiles for most investors from a search on the 
internet. The first interviews were made with the two co-founders and provided initial information 
on the venture and on the entrepreneurs, as well as on their expectations vis à vis the potential 
investors and the future governance of the company. The second set of interviews was conducted 
in June/July 2010, just after the financing round and around the time of the first board meeting, 
with the co-founders, two business angels and two VCs. We were able to gather valuable 
information on the investors’ characteristics, on their intentions concerning the future governance 
of the venture, and on the context and the dynamics of the initial board formation. The third set of 
interviews was performed between July and December 2011 (i.e. 12 to 18 months following the 
board formation) with the founders and four of the five external board members in order to get 
information on how the board was actually working and performing its roles. 
 
 Coding scheme 
 
     The interviews were coded independently by two of the authors, one of whom not having 
attended the interviews. Coding was done using NVivo software, according to a coding scheme 
containing the major concepts of our conceptual framework. The inter-coder agreement rates are 
high, with an average for all nodes of 94.1 % (minimum 85.0%, maximum 98.8%). The coding 
scheme and the number of references coded per item and per actor are indicated in table 2. 
 
THE CASE 
 
     In this section we present a the venture studied, the external investors, the process of board 
formation and the initial board tasks and roles. 
 
 A brief case history 
 
     EBV is a French venture created in 2006 by two first-time entrepreneurs. Their primary 
competency is technological, with a strong engineering background. The prior experience of one 
of the founders (Entrepreneur 1, the CEO) at a major high-tech firm has led him to develop ideas 
about the existence of a market for a new technological application in the design of electronic 
components. The prototype of the first product, an application aiming at filling the need 
previously identified by entrepreneur 1, was then developed, tested, and sold to the first (big 
industrial) clients in 2008. Sales grew at a three-digit rate between 2008 and 2009. This early stage 
growth phase did not require external investors, as the founders used bootstrapping and received 
subsidies from the government and from a local entrepreneurs’ association. However, in 2010, the 
venture was at a stage where it needed to intensify commercial efforts and to expand the client-
base to satisfy its ambition to become a standard reference for the industry at an international 
level. As most customers are based outside Europe, this commercial development and the 
necessity of sustaining a strong effort in research and development required new funding.  
 
External investors 
 
     After various contacts with financial investors, the encounter with a business angel (Angel 1) 
has proved to be particularly conclusive. This investor is a former scientist and entrepreneur who 
successfully founded, managed and sold his own venture – a software editor – and acquired a 
strong entrepreneurial experience in the process. Angel 1 and entrepreneur 1 have established a 
close and confident relationship, the former acting as a mentor to the latter even before he invested 
in the company. Angel 1 is strongly convinced of the quality of EBV’s team and project. The 
strength of his persuasion, as well as his local credibility and reputation, were key in attracting the 
group of investors who took part in the financing round.  
 
     The other external investors are three more BAs and three VC funds. Angel 2 is an US-based 
French who was formerly a co-founder of the Angel-1-venture. He has been responsible for the 
development of the latter’s American business and is now the CEO for America of a French 
software company. Angel 3 is also a successful former entrepreneur, although from a totally 
different field. Having a doctor’s degree in pharmacy, and after several years of work experience 
in the field, he created a biotech venture which he was able to sell in 2007 to an international 
competitor. He then set up a family venture fund which made several investments in the life 
sciences sector. Angel 4 is a business-school teacher and works as a consultant in the area of 
entrepreneurship and finance. Capitalist 1 is a local venture capital firm which was created at the 
initiative of regional public bodies. Its CEO, who is in charge of the EBV investment, is a former 
business-school teacher. This relatively small VC firm is specialized in investing in early-stage 
innovative start-ups based in the region. Capitalist 1 was informed (and convinced) of the 
opportunity to invest in EBV by angel1, who is a member of his investment committee. He then 
became the leading actor in forming the investor group, inviting to the deal angels 3 and 4 as well 
as capitalists 2 and 3. Capitalist 2 is a large French independent venture capital firm. The manager 
in charge of the EBV investment has a French business school degree and joined the firm in 2002. 
He has a strong investment experience in the IT industry. Capitalist 3 is the private-equity 
subsidiary of a regional French deposit bank.  
 
Board formation 
 
     Three investors (capitalist 1, capitalist 2 and angel 3) act as the main negotiators of the deal 
with the entrepreneurs and play a key role in designing the post-investment governance structure. 
These investors require that the company be managed by a CEO (Entrepreneur 1) and controlled 
by a board representing the major shareholders as well as providing a mix of complementary 
skills. They join the board alongside angel 2 and one independent director (table 1). The 
independent director (ID) is not an investor in EBV. He is a serial entrepreneur, claiming to have 
founded and sold fifteen companies in high technology. He has personal ties with the founders and 
is the former CEO of a successful venture financed by capitalist 2.  
 
     With respect to actor characteristics, the above descriptions indicate a certain degree of 
heterogeneity in personal trajectories (formal education, professional work experience), in 
knowledge and skills (industry specific, financial, entrepreneurial know-how...), as well as in 
institutional position as an investor (BA, VC). This may lead to specific expectations concerning 
the venture’s governance and the role of the board, as well as to diverse levels of identification by 
the actors with potential director roles. Certain expectations concerning the governance process 
appear even before the financing round is actually performed and the board formally established. 
Entrepreneur 1 and 2 are willing to attract angel investors because they may provide them with 
advice and counsel on issues for which they lack the requisite experience, such as the venture’s 
international development and future exit. They are mostly concerned with the resource provision 
role of the board. On the investors’ side, Angel 1, although having played a key role during the 
first contacts in helping the entrepreneurs to convince the investors of the strong potential value 
inherent in the project, is practically not involved in the formal negotiations concerning the deal, 
and decides not to participate in the board process. Angel 2, angel 4 and capitalist 3 mostly act as 
followers in the negotiations and their input concerning board formation seems very limited.  
 
Initial board tasks and roles 
 
     The main initial task of the board is the provision of information on the venture’s activity and 
progress by the two founders to the external members. In fact, during our observation period, EBV 
is progressing as planned and follows the strategy initially formulated by the co-founders. 
Therefore no need to discuss key strategic issues is felt. However the board works on some 
important implementation issues for which the experience and knowledge of its members can be 
used: the setting-up of an EBV subsidiary in the US and the choice of its manager (given the 
importance of the US market, entrepreneur 1 eventually moves to the US in August 2011 to run 
operations there, while remaining CEO), and the design of a stock option plan for EBV 
employees. Importantly, board tasks are not performed during formal meetings only. Entrepreneur 
1 has frequent informal contacts with angel 2 and with the independent director. He also continues 
to exchange ideas and information with Angel 1, although the latter is not a board member. 
 
     A specialisation of external board members rapidly emerges with regard to their roles. Angel 2 
is mostly concerned with providing practical advice regarding the US market and the creation of 
the US branch. ID is also focused on resource provision. Thanks to his background as serial 
entrepreneur in businesses close to EBV’s, he is able to share his experience with entrepreneur 1, 
acting as an advisor and sounding board. The three other board members (Angel 3, Capitalists 1 
and 2) are mostly involved in monitoring. They contribute to the initial work routines of the board. 
They also provide advice in areas in which they have a specific experience or expertise, such as 
the design of the employees’ stock-options plan as well as on legal and financial management 
issues regarding the creation of the US branch. 
 
RESULTS 
 
     The number of references coded per actor for each dimension of the model is indicated in table 
2. 
 
Board formation is strongly influenced by the characteristics of salient stakeholders 
 
     We first observe that specific salient stakeholders are leading the board formation process. The 
leading role is played by capitalist 1. Once convinced of the interest of the EBV deal, he becomes 
the major actor in forming the investor group and, at a second stage, the board of directors. The 
other salient stakeholders in this process are angel 1, who introduces angel 2 to the deal and to the 
board, and entrepreneur 1, who proposes that ID joins the board. As expected, all actors of the 
case, although being potential board members, do not join the board. In fact, board membership is 
mainly influenced by three factors: identification, knowledge/capabilities and, to a lesser extent, 
interests/financial stakes. 
 
     The three investors who have the strongest identification with the “shareholder” status become 
board members: angel 3 is a very successful entrepreneur who set up a family VC fund and whose 
main activity is presently to invest in young ventures; capitalists 1 and 2 are professional VCs who 
frequently act as lead investors. All three are also the main actors in the pre-investment 
negotiations with the co-founders. On the contrary, angel 1 decides not to participate in the board, 
although his experience, reputation and early role in funding would allow him to do so. A 
successful entrepreneur, his main identification is with “industry” and with the “entrepreneur” 
status. He does not consider himself as a financier, and his main motivation as business angel is to 
help young entrepreneurs to succeed, rather than to make money (“I was helped a lot in my career 
by state funded grants and subsidies. It seems rather natural that I help in return”.)  However, 
although not being a board member, angel 1 continues to provide resources to EBV by mentoring 
entrepreneur 1 through informal conversations. In addition, when angel 1 introduces angel 2 to the 
deal, it seems that it is both for the latter’s potential ability to provide resources to the venture (as a 
software industry specialist and a US based entrepreneur) and because he is a close business 
partner who may act as a kind of de facto representative. 
 
     Possessing the knowledge and capabilities that offer a strong potential contribution in the post-
investment phase are another important factor for becoming a board member. Capitalist 1 insists 
on the fact that he considers EBV’s board as a “nice” board because of the complementary skills it 
gathers “…with two industry guys, one being a shareholder and living in the US (Angel 2) and the 
other a sector specialist (ID); two VCs who have good industry knowledge (N.B.: capitalists 1 and 
2, who made previous investments in the sector) (…) and a successful entrepreneur who managed 
a startup and did a very, very nice exit (angel 3).” On the contrary, angel 4, who does not have a 
significant entrepreneurial experience and specific industry expertise, is not offered to join the 
board. Nor is capitalist 3, who acted as a follower since he was brought to the deal by capitalist 1, 
in spite of the fact that his financial stake in the deal is similar to capitalist 2. 
 
     Financial interests are not absent as a determinant of board formation. Whereas board 
membership was strongly influenced by capitalist 1 for the investor side, ID’s appointment as an 
independent director is proposed by entrepreneur 1. In addition to ID’s potential contribution to 
venture success, this choice is viewed by entrepreneur 1 as a means to protect the entrepreneurs’ 
interests in case a conflict would arise with the financial investors. Entrepreneur 1 and ID have 
close personal ties; he trusts him and views his membership as a way to equilibrate the balance of 
power between investors and founders. Entrepreneur 1 had the project to hire a second 
independent director on the board, but this was refused by the financial investors. Entrepreneur 1: 
“For me, bringing (a second independent director) was not necessarily linked to the provision of 
resources, but to have another vote on the board. Today the majority of the board is on the 
investors’ side. We brought ID in. I said to myself that if we wanted to rebalance the power in our 
favor, it would be good to bring in another member.” 
 
Board routines: formal and informal governance processes 
 
     The formation of board routines is influenced by members’ individual characteristics. On the 
investor side, capitalists 1 and 2 and angel 3, who strongly identify with “shareholder” (and whose 
board monitoring roles are important) are the major contributors. On the founders’ side, 
entrepreneur 1, the CEO, plays the main role. Formal board meetings are held every three months. 
They are mostly dedicated to reporting by entrepreneurs to the board (entrepreneur 2 participates 
to the meetings although not being formally a member). Specific strategic and organizational 
issues are also discussed. Additional meetings are held when needed, as was the case to discuss 
the implementation of the stock-option plan for EBV employees. 
 
     The initial reporting format is proposed by entrepreneur 1. Minor adaptations asked for by the 
external members are progressively put in place. Minutes and pre-reads, which were absent during 
the very first meetings, are also regularly sent after a request by angel 3. This process is eased by 
the experience and capabilities of entrepreneurs 1 and 2. They were previously working in large 
industrial companies and were consequently used to reporting requirements. They also have an 
open and professional behavior, and consider the investors’ requests as positive constraints, which 
contribute to the efficiency of the board’s collective work.  As expressed by entrepreneur 1: 
“(these routines) may look dull and are not always put in place; the fact that (the investors) 
impose this rigor makes us more efficient”.     
 
     The two other external board members, angel 2 and ID, are not involved in the setting up of 
formal board routines. This can be explained by the fact that they identify themselves with 
“entrepreneurs” much more than with “shareholders”, and therefore do not consider their primary 
role in organizing the way the board works, nor in monitoring management, but rather in 
providing advice and support. A striking feature of the case is that resource provision by angel 2 
and ID is largely made outside formal board meetings. In fact two parallel governance processes 
emerge since board formation: a formal one and an informal one, and the respective involvement 
of board members in these processes depends on their social identification: 
 Informal governance: angel 2 and ID provide resources to entrepreneur 1 mostly on an 
informal basis, through one to one phone calls and meetings; this informal interaction is 
particularly frequent between ID and entrepreneur 1, as they have close personal ties and 
ID has excellent industry knowledge. ID says: “With (entrepreneur 1) it is different, 
because he is a pal. Each time I can, we meet (…). We speak on Skype once a week (…) 
We speak about the business: «where do you stand? What do you do?”  
 Formal governance: capitalists 1 and 2 and angel 3, who identify strongly with 
“shareholders” mostly view the board as a monitoring device; they set up the formal 
board routines (with entrepreneur 1) and most of their contacts with the entrepreneurs 
materialize during formal meetings. 
  
Board roles are influenced by member’s capabilities and identification 
 
     The board of EBV hence plays both monitoring and resource provision roles. Each board 
member’s contribution is influenced by individual knowledge/capabilities and social 
identification. In fact, a certain degree of specialization appears within the board members. 
  
     Capitalists 1 and 2, with angel 3, are board members mostly acting as monitors. They consider 
that the main function of board meetings is to provide information on the venture’s operations and 
performance. As capitalist 1 states “above all, we are here to learn, to understand what is going 
on; so generally we don’t have a lot to say, unless on the issues on which we have some 
competencies”. They mostly listen to the entrepreneurs’ presentations, sometimes challenge them. 
However, they also provide resources, mostly by bringing advice on issues on which they have an 
expertise as investors, such as the setting up of the stock options plan.  
 
     Angel 3 is a hybrid character. A former successful entrepreneur and a wealthy business angel, 
he has multiple identification with entrepreneur and shareholder identities, but not at all with 
EBV’s industry. He features strong contributions both to monitoring and to resource provision. He 
is very good at spotting the key issues and at challenging the entrepreneurs. Capitalist 2 says “he 
asks questions that are never misplaced; on the contrary they are extremely well targeted and help 
everybody to progress; although he has no experience (in EBV’s industry) he can bring strength 
to the entrepreneur, a lot of strength.” Thanks to his entrepreneurial experience, angel 3 brings 
valuable expertise and advice on general management issues, such as the employees’ stock option 
plan and the transfer prices between the French headquarters and the new US subsidiary.   
 
     Angel 2 and ID have mostly a resource provision role and specialize in areas linked to their 
respective experiences and capabilities. Angel 2 brings information and advice regarding the US 
software market, as he already set up and managed two US subsidiaries of French software firms. 
ID brings general entrepreneurial experience, as well as strong industry knowledge and a network 
of personal contacts. In fact, ID’s contribution to resource provision is mostly informal. The 
qualitative analysis of the interviews shows that other board members seem not to be aware that 
entrepreneur 1 and ID have frequent informal meetings.  
 
     It is worthwhile noting that, one year after initial board formation, entrepreneur 1 values the 
sounding board and counseling roles played by the board, although he did not expect a lot initially: 
”… I did not think the board would bring anything to us. For me it was a one-direction process: 
we inform them, they are investors, we had no choice, they had to enter to bring us money (…). 
Maybe I push it a bit too far, but this is what I had in mind. Now I think I solicit them more than I 
thought (…) They bring a bit more.”  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
     Our study yields several interesting results concerning early board formation and roles in 
young entrepreneurial ventures. Combining corporate governance and entrepreneurial finance, we 
propose a theoretical model linking stakeholder’s characteristics (financial stakes, capabilities, 
identity) and their respective contributions to the formation of the board, to its work routines and 
to its roles. We confront the model with a longitudinal in-depth case study of a young venture 
raising external equity for the first time from a group of business angels and venture capital funds.  
 
     The board formation process is led by the venture capitalist who played a leading role in the 
organization of the financing round, regarding both the formation of the group of investors and the 
negotiation process with the venture’s founders. Not all investors join the board. In fact two main 
conditions seem to prevail for seeking membership: (1) having the required capabilities for 
contributing to venture success through complementary potential monitoring or resource provision 
roles (these capabilities have often been shown during the negotiation process) (2) having a strong 
“shareholder” identification, probably because the latter is necessary to provide the required 
motivation to act as board member. Previous research shows that the business angel population is 
heterogeneous. This is confirmed by our study regarding the degree of identification with 
“shareholder” status, which significantly differs from one angel to another.  
 
     The formal board routines are co-constructed by the entrepreneur/CEO and the board members 
who most strongly identify themselves with shareholders and are prone to monitor management, 
with practically no contribution by the other members. The observation of evolving board routines 
shows that certain members participate in two parallel processes of interaction with the 
entrepreneurs. Formal board meetings essentially serve the purpose of regular monitoring, whereas 
certain board members contribute to resource provision in parallel informal interactions, when 
they strongly identify themselves with entrepreneurs as a social group. One important angel-
investor does not join the board because he identifies himself more strongly with entrepreneurs 
than with shareholders as a social group. He directly provides resources to entrepreneurs through 
informal mentoring. 
 
     The roles played by the board members are influenced by their capabilities and their social 
identification. Venture capitalists (and an angel with strong shareholder identification) are much 
more involved in monitoring than the other members. However, the fact that some board members 
are strongly involved in both monitoring and resource provision shows that these two roles are not 
mutually exclusive.     
 
CONTACT: Peter Wirtz; peter.wirtz@univ-lyon3.fr; (T): +336 50 96 17 50; (F) : +334 78 78 79 
79 ; Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3, 19 rue Chevreul, 69007 Lyon, France.  
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FIGURE ONE 
Entrepreneurial finance and the nascent board: a conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE ONE 
EBV case actors 
 
Actor Background Interviewed at stage: EBV 
board 
member 
EBV 
shareholder Pre-
round 
Round Post-
round 
Entrepreneur 1 EBV co-founder, CEO 
Engineering degree, worked in large 
IT firm 
       
Entrepreneur 2 EBV co-founder, CTO 
Engineering degree, worked in large 
IT firm 
   
   
Angel 1 PhD (computer science), research 
Founder of a technological venture 
   
   
Angel 2 Management degree 
Co-founder of a technological venture 
Presently CEO for America of a 
       
Potential board 
members’ characteristics 
Process of board formation 
and potential board roles 
Ongoing board process 
and actual board roles  
BA 1 
Financial stake; 
Knowledge, 
capabilities; 
Identity 
VC 1 
Financial stake; 
Knowledge, 
capabilities; 
Identity 
Entrepreneur and 
other 
Financial stake; 
Knowledge, 
capabilities; 
Identity 
Monitoring 
Resource provision 
Monitoring 
Resource provision 
Individual 
motivations 
and capabilities
Collective learning and 
emerging board routines 
Economic contingencies (Life-cycle stage, growth, performance); e.g. 
resource provision and knowledge creation appear to be especially critical 
board functions in fast growing threshold firms, where the board may act 
as a cognitive lever of growth (Wirtz 2011; Zahra and Filatotchev 2004). 
French software company  
Angel 3 PhD in pharmacy 
Successful entrepreneur in life science 
Manages a family VC fund 
       
Angel 4 Academic/consultant       
Capitalist 1 Local VC (managing partner) 
Initially a business school teacher 
30 year experience in VC 
       
Capitalist 2 National VC (partner) 
Management degree 
12 year experience in VC  
       
Capitalist 3 National VC       
Independent 
director 
Serial entrepreneur / angel investor       
 
 
TABLE TWO 
Number of references coded per item and per actor 
 
  
E1 E 2 Angel 1 
Angel 
2   
Angel 
3 
Angel 
4  C 1  C2 C 3  ID Total 
 Interests-Financial Stakes 4 1 1 4 6 1 16 17 1 0 51 
Knowledge-Capabilities :  
  
Entrepreneurial 9 6 10 14 21 2 7 4 1 12 86 
Functional-business development 7 4 14 21 9 1 16 16 2 15 105 
Functional-corporate finance 6 2 2 3 6 3 18 19 2 2 63 
Functional- technology development 3 2 5 3 1 0 2 0 0 2 18 
Identification :  
  
Identification with entrepreneurs 6 3 7 8 28 0 7 4 0 11 74 
Identification with industry 1 2 9 6 19 0 14 12 1 9 73 
Identification with shareholders  1 0 5 5 11 2 9 17 2 3 38 
Identification with directorship 2 0 1 0 2 0 4 1 2 0 12 
Identification with stakeholders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
Process of board formation :  
  
Board formation-membership 13 9 50 23 38 9 62 39 7 18 268 
Board formation-routines 25 15 18 24 21 3 25 28 4 24 187 
Board Role : 
  
Resource provision 20 10 35 40 36 10 31 22 5 29 238 
Monitoring 10 9 0 8 17 1 16 15 4 2 82 
Economic contingencies 3 0 0 3 2 0 6 4 0 1 19 
Total references 107 63 157 162 217 32 233 198 31 128  
N.B. Coding was conducted independently by two authors with NVIVO software. Each coded reference was given at least 
two codes: one concerning an item of the model and one for the name of the actor concerned by the reference. Absolute 
figures in the table indicate the number of references coded for a given item.  
